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Abstract
The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal lan-
guage within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the
14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from
Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the ctum
theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the intellectio
theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of con-
cepts as unsaturated cognitive structures. Intentional objects (cta)
are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objectied intensional
contents of concepts. Their reconstruction as intensional objects is an
essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is
by means of this theory that we are able to explain how the identity
theory of the copula, which was basic to teminist logic, applies to cat-
egorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism is not the same
as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various modes of
personal supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justied
in terms of this conceptualist theory of reference.
1 Introduction
Medieval logic was a philosophical logic, by which we mean a logic that is
based on a philosophical theory of predication, which in turn is based on a
theory of universals. The three major types of medieval theories of universals
were nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. Today, each of these types of
theories can be reconstructed and represented by distinctive formal theories
of predication; in particular, each can be logically reconstructed as a second-
order logic with nominalized predicates (and propositional forms) as abstract
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singular terms.1
The traditional view of logic as based on a theory of predication, which
in turn is based on a theory of universals, is sometimes described as the view
of logic as language, a view that was defended by the founders of logicism,
Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. The logistic systems of Frege and Rus-
sell have not fared well in 20th century logic, however, which is not generally
viewed as a philosophical logic. The predominant modern view of logic is
that of a formal calculus subject to varying set-theoretical interpretations, a
view sometimes described as logic as calculus.2 We do not dispute the im-
portance of such a view, and in fact we nd it useful as a mathematical tool.
Nevertheless, the traditional view is what is important for philosophical pur-
poses, and, when formalized using the tools of modern mathematical logic, it
can be used to represent not only a theory of universals but a general formal
ontology, a system of knowledge representation, and a variety of dierent
positions in the philosophies of mind and language. One such framework is
what elsewhere we have called conceptual realism, a logistic system that is
based on a conceptual theory of predication, but which also contains a natu-
ral realism amounting to a modern form of Aristotelian essentialism and an
intensional realism amounting to a naturalized form of platonism.3 This lo-
gistic system is also a form of second-order logic with nominalized predicates
as abstract singular terms.
Reference in conceptual realism is not restricted to so-called singular
terms, e.g. proper names and denite descriptions, but involves quantier
phrases containing common nouns or proper names, where the former can be
complex as well as simple. This uniform account of both singular and general
reference is similar in a number of respects to the medieval suppositio theory
of the 14th century; and, in fact, we maintain that with minor modications
the latter can be reconstructed within the framework of conceptual realism.
1See Cocchiarella [1986] for a formal exposition of such logical reconstructions. Nomi-
nalism, for example, can be represented by standard predicative second-order logic under
a substitutional interpretation for predicate quantiers, extended to allow for nominalized
predicates as abstract singular termsbut where the rst-order part of the logic is free
of existential presuppositions, and where all abstract singular terms are posited as nonde-
noting, thereby representing the nominalist thesis that there are no universals as values of
either the bound individual or the bound predicate variables.
2See van Heijenoort [1967] for a characterization of these two views of logic.
3See Cocchiarella [1996] for a description of conceptual realism as a formal ontology
and Cocchiarella [1995] for a description of conceptual realism as a system for knowledge
representation in articial intelligence.
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Indeed, conceptual realism provides a general philosophical framework within
which we can reconstruct and explicate not just the medieval suppositio the-
ory as a theory of reference, but a number of other issues that were central
to medieval logic as well, such as the identity theory of the copula (for cate-
gorical propositions) and the dierence between real and nominal denitions.
One of the benets of such a reconstruction is that we can defend medieval
logic against the kinds of arguments that Peter Geach has given against a
uniform account of general and singular reference in his book Reference and
Generality.4
2 Terminist Logic and Mental Language
The medieval logic we will be concerned with here is what came to be called
terminist logic because it was primarily concerned with the semantics or
properties of terms (proprietates terminorum), i.e. of adjectives and proper
and common count nouns, which hereafter we will speak of as common names.
This approach to logic began in the 13th century with such logicians as Pe-
ter of Spain, Roger Bacon, Lambert of Auxerre, and William of Sherwood.
Around 1270, however, terminist logic went into a kind of hibernation and
was replaced by an alternative movement known as speculative grammar.5
The hibernation ended in the early 14th century when terminist-style se-
mantic theory woke up again.6 The major terminist logicians of this later
period are William of Ockham, John Buridan, Walter Burley, and Gregory
of Rimini. Ockham and Buridan are generally described as nominalists, but
really were conceptualists on our account. Burley is said to be a realist, but
his realism was really a form of conceptual natural realism (which we will
not go into here).
The conceptualism of the terminist logicians is clearly seen in their as-
sumption that underlying spoken and written language there exists a men-
tal language made up of both categorematic and syncategorematic concepts
and mental propositions, or what in conceptual realism we prefer to call
4See T.K. Scott [1966b] for criticism of Geach's account of Ockham's suppositio theory.
Also, see Cocchiarella [1998] for a refutation of Geach's general arguments against of the
kind of uniform account of reference given in conceptual realism.
5Spade [1996], p.43. Spade gives a useful account of the history of this period. We will
be relying on this text throughout this essay.
6Ibid.
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judgmentsor thoughts when they are only entertained and not asserted or
judged.7 This language of thought, which is generally referred to today
as Mental, was assumed to be common to all humans.8 Unlike spoken and
written languages, which were said to be conventional languages, Men-
tal was said to be a natural language, by which was meant a language
somehow established by nature. Apparently, what makes Mental natural is
that its categorematic concepts (mental terms) get their signication by na-
ture and not by convention.9 Signication is the basic semantical relation
of Mental, but it applies only to categorematic concepts, syncategorematic
concepts being said not to signify at all. The signication of a categorematic
concept is not an intensional object, but rather the things that fall under
the concept, by which was meant, in a narrow sense, the things that now
fall under the concept, but which, in a wider sense, included the things that
could fall under the concept, i.e. the things that can fall under the concept,
and therefore the things that did, do, or will fall under the concept as well.
This distinction between narrow and wide signication was possible because
our thoughts (mental propositions) occur in time and, by means of tense and
modal modications, can be oriented toward the past or the future, as well
as the present, and even toward what is merely possible. Mental is a tensed
and modal language, in other words, containing among its syncategorematic
concepts certain operators that correspond to the tenses and modal modi-
cations of verbs, or what the medieval logicians called ampliation. Moreover,
because mental terms can signify in a wider sense, Mental is ontologically
committed to a form of possibilism, though the possible objects signied (in
the wide sense) by a concept seemed to be only those that are possible in
nature.10
That mental terms get their signication by nature is based on the idea
that there is a natural likeness between concepts and the things they sig-
7In conceptual realism, a proposition is the intensional content of a speech or mental
act, and not, as in terminist logic, the assertion or judgment made. We will allow some
laxity in the use of `proposition' in our account of terminist logic, however.
8Geach in [1957], p.102, is one of the rst to use `Mental' this way. See Trentman
[1970], Normore [1990], and Spade [1996], chapter 4, for an account of Mental. Normore
[1985], p.189, explicitly refers to it as as a language of thought.
9Spade [1996], p.93.
10See Normore [1985], p.191. It is not clear Normore would agree that all possibilia
in Ockham's and Buridan's ontology are possible in nature, i.e. that the modality in
question is a natural possibility (as opposed, e.g., to a logical or metaphysical possibility).
A natural possibility and necessity seems to be what Burley had in mind, however.
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nify, a natural likeness that is caused, apparently, by the things signied.11
This suggests that concepts are something like images, which is much too
restrictive a view in that it excludes those concepts of things that cannot
be imaged, i.e. things other than the visible objects of the macrophysical
world. Scientic concepts of things, processes and events in the microphysical
world can be mathematically modelled, and in that sense imagined, but,
because they are smaller than the wavelength of light, they cannot be im-
aged or pictured literally, and therefore there can be no natural likeness
between our concepts and such things. Nor, of course, can there be a natural
likeness (or a causal relation) between concepts and mathematical objects,
be they numbers, sets, elds, or whatever.12 This idea of a natural like-
ness also suggests that the concepts corresponding to common names must
all be sortal concepts, i.e. concepts that have identity criteria associated
with them. But the concepts corresponding to the common names `thing',
`object', `individual', and even `physical object', and `abstract object', do not
have identity criteria associated with them, the way, e.g., the common names
`man', `dog', `carrot', `chair', etc., do. Even the common name `furniture',
unlike dierent sorts of furniture (such as tables and chairs) and the common
name `event', unlike sorts of events (such as a running, kicking, or kissing)
do not have identity criteria associated with them. In what sense is there a
natural likeness between things in general and the common-name concept
thing, or between physical objects and the complex common-name concept
physical object? We can form an image of a chair or table, i.e., of a particular
sort of furniture, but we cannot form an image of furniture in general, nor
can we form an image of events in general, though we can form an image
of a kissing (between, say, Abelard and Heloise, or Bill and Monica). The
notion that all categorematic concepts have a natural similarity with the
things they signify is much too restrictive and is one of the semantic features
of Mental that we do not assume applies to the kind of conceptualism we
11According to Spade , Ockham says the things a concept signies are all such that:
(a) The concept is like every one of them. (b) It is not like any one of them any more
than it is like any other one; it is equally like all of them. (c) It is like any one of them
more than it like anything elseanything that is not signied by the concept. ([1996],
pp.153f)
12It seems that mathematical objects were not accounted for at all in terminist logic.
The reconstruction we give below in terms of conceptual realism provides a way of giving
an account along logicist lines, but without the latter's commitment to logical realism (as
a form of metaphysical platonism).
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have in mind here. For this reason, we will not refer hereafter to Mental as a
natural language, but will instead follow contemporary practice and speak
of historically real languages such as Latin, English, French, etc., as natural
languages. We prefer the contemporary usage partly because it is contem-
porary, but also because we want to distinguish articial languages (such as
HST described below), which are also conventional, from the historically
developed natural languages spoken by a linguistic community.
In regard to the relation between Mental and spoken (and written) lan-
guages, Ockham's view diers somewhat from Buridan's. According to Ock-
ham, for example, a linguistic term used in an assertion signies the same
things that are signied by the concept corresponding to the term. Buridan,
on the other hand, says that the spoken linguistic term signies the concept
corresponding to the term, and only indirectly, through the concept, signies
the things that it signies.13 In conceptualism, we take a position similar
to Ockham's in that, e.g., a referential expression of English that occurs as
the noun phrase of an assertion in English refers to the same things that are
referred to by the referential concept that the expression stands forand, in
fact, the linguistic act is just the mental act expressed overtly in English.14
On the other hand, we do want to say in conceptualism that a referential
expression of a spoken language stands for (stat pro) a referential concept,
and similarly that a predicable expression stands for a predicable concept,
that might be exercised in a given speech act, which might seem in some
respects similar to what Buridan says. But then, Ockham does have a no-
tion of subordination, which he says holds between a linguistic term and the
corresponding concept, which seems to be essentially what is meant in saying
that the term stands for the concept. It is Ockham's position, in other words,
that is closer to conceptualism as we understand it here.
The relation between a conventional language such as Latin or English
and a language of thought such as Mental is sometimes said to be analogical,
especially by writers sympathetic to nominalism. Peter Geach, for exam-
ple, held the general thesis that language about thoughts is an analogical
development of language about language,15 and, in particular, that the
concept judging is ... an analogical extension of the concept saying.16 Sim-
13Cf. Normore [1985], p.190, and Spade [1996], chapter 3.
14This is not to say that there are no inner episodes of thinking, i.e. of referring and




ilarly, Wilfrid Sellars claimed that our view of thoughts as inner episodes
is a theoretical construction modelled upon our view of meaningful linguistic
behavior, and in particular that concepts pertaining to the intentionality of
thoughts, such as that of reference, are derivative from concepts pertain-
ing to meaningful speech.17 The thesis does seem to be one that Ockham
followed in that some of the features of Latin are assumed to carry over into
Mental. Indeed, according to Geach, the grammar of Mental turns out to
be remarkably like Latin grammar. There are nouns and verbs in Mental;
nouns have cases and numbers, and verbs have voice, mood, tense, number,
and person.18
Despite his general thesis, Geach warns us not to carry the analogy too
far. Ockham, in particular, according to Geach, merely transfers features
of Latin grammar to Mental, and then regards this as explaining why such
features occur in Latin.19 Except for mood and tense, Geach maintains,
the grammatical properties ascribed by Ockham to Mental words may all
be easily dismissed.20 The exception is noteworthy because tense does enter
into the content of our thoughts, and, according to Geach, there are modal
dierences between thoughtsthough the moods of a natural language like
Latin are a very inadequate indication of this, being cluttered with a lot of
logically insignicant idiomatic uses.21
Geach's claim that Ockham carried the analogy of thought to language
too far has been attacked on several fronts.22 Nevertheless, his critics agree
that the proper comparison is not of Mental with Latin but of Mental with the
kind of ideal languages that logicians and philosophers have constructed
in the twentieth century, i.e. with a logistic system from the point of view
of logic as language. Thus, according to J. Trentman, Ockham's real cri-
terion ... for admitting grammatical distinctions into Mental amounts to
asking whether the distinctions in question would be necessary in an ideal
languageideal for a complete, true description of the world.23 Similarly,
17Sellars [1981], p.326. Also, see Empiricism and the Philsophy of Mind in Sellars
[1963].
18Geach [1957], p.102. See Spade [1996], chapter 4, for a more detailed list of the com-
mon and proper accidents of nouns and verbs of Latin, but where only the common




22See Trentman [1970] and Spade [1996], chapter 4.
23[1970], p.589.
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according to Paul Spade, mental language is to be a kind of ideal language,
which has only those features it needs to enable it to discern the true from
the false, to describe the world adequately and accurately.24 Of course, an
ideal language should account not only for an adequate and accurate de-
scription of the world, but also for valid reasoning about the world. In other
words, Mental should be constructed as a logically ideal language, relative
to which analyses of natural language sentences can be given, thereby result-
ing in logically perspicuous representations of the truth conditions of those
sentences. The logical forms representing these truth conditions would then
determine which sentences follow validly from other sentences as premises,
i.e. they would then determine the conditions for valid reasoning in terms of
the recursive operations of logical syntax.25
The kind of analyses of natural language sentences intended here are what
the terminist logicians called expounding (exponere) or exposing (expos-
ito). Thus, according to Calvin Normore, exposito is a natural result of the
recognition that the surface grammar of a sentence is not always a reliable
guide either to its truth conditions or its inferential connections to other
sentences, which suggests that the analysis (or exposition) of a natural lan-
guage sentence (of Latin, English, etc.) should not result in another sentence
of that language but in a logical form of an ideal language based on logical
grammar.26 That is why the proper province of logic for Buridan, accord-
ing to Normore, is the articulation of truth conditions for grammatically
complex sentences, i.e. the process of making the logical form of sentences
explicit.27
What is needed in terminist logic, but up until now has not be given, is
a representation of Mental as a logistic system based on the view of logic as
language, and in particular on a conceptualist theory of predication. Such a
system should provide a perspicuous representation of the truth conditions
of our speech and mental acts, and thereby, in terms of the recursive opera-
tions of logical syntax, the validity of our arguments as well. Moreover, as a
24[1996], p.110.
25The recursive operations of logical syntax will generate some logical forms that do
not represent propositions of Mental, however, but which are needed for the deductive
machinery of the ideal language by which to prove the validity of argumentsand for the
generation of those forms that do represent the propositions of Mental as well. (See 7 for




conceptualist theory of our speech and mental acts, the system should also
provide logical forms that perspicuously represent the cognitive structure of
those acts, including in particular the referential and predicable concepts un-
derlying them. It is these concepts that in one way or another correspond
to what the terminist logicians called supposition. The system we have de-
scribed for conceptual realism, we believe, can be used in just this way, even if
some features of the system may seem to be in conict with certain terminist
theses.
3 Conceptual Intensional realism
There are two kinds of realism in conceptual realism: an intensional real-
ism in which some, though not all, nominalized predicates and propositional
forms are posited as having denotata, and a natural realism in which, on the
basis of empirical data, natural kinds and natural properties and relations
are posited as corresponding to certain of our sortal and predicable concepts.
Our concern here will be only with the system of conceptual intensional real-
ism, the core of which is an extension of standard second-order predicate logic
in which predicate and propositional forms can be nominalized and allowed
to occur as abstract singular terms on a par with individual variablesbut
with the one modication that the rst-order part of the logic is free of exis-
tential presuppositions for singular terms.28 Complex predicates are formed
by means of -abstraction, so that where ' is a formula and y1; :::; yn are
distinct individual variables, [y1:::yn'] is an n-place predicate expression.
A predicate expression is always accompanied by a pair of parentheses (and
commas if it is relational) when it occurs in its functional role as a predicate,
as in F (x1; :::; xn) and [y1:::yn'](x1; :::; xn), where F is an n-place predicate
letter. (We drop the parentheses and commas when referring to predicate
expressions simpliciter.) We nominalize a predicate by dropping the paren-
theses (and commas) and allow the result to occur as an abstract singular
termas in G(F ), G([y1:::yn']), R(x; F ), and even G(G), and R(x;R),
28Strictly speaking, this core system is constructed on the basis of a conceptually prior
system of constructive conceptualism, i.e. one in which only predicative and no im-
predicative concepts (such as the concept of a limit in mathematics) can be formed. This
predicative logic is part of the core system, but we will ignore it here because the dis-
tinctions in concept-formation it was design to represent were not considered in terminist
logic. We assume that tense and modal operators are also part of the system, but we will
generally ignore their use here.
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where G is a 1-place and R a 2-place predicate. (We use capital letters for
predicate variables and constants, lower-case letters for individual variables,
and Greek letters for formulas.) Nominalized formulas are represented as 0-
place predicates, as in ['], read as `that '', which we will write more simply
as ['].
The comprehension principle of our core theory, which we call HST, can
be stated in the following simple form (where F is not free in '),
(9F )([x1:::xn'] = F );(CP

)
from which the more usual (but weaker) form,
(9F )(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ '];(CP
)
follows. Russell's paradox, as represented through the Russell predicate
[x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))], is not derivable in HST. By (CP

), the Russell
predicate stands for a concept, i.e.,
(9F )([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F );
and therefore
(9F )(8x)[F (x)$ (9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))];
are provable in HST; but all that follows by Russell's argument is that when
nominalized, the abstract singular term corresponding to the Russell predi-
cate fails to denote an object (as a value of the bound individual variables),
i.e.,
:(9y) ([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y)
is provable.29 This shows that not every concept can be nominalized in
conceptual realism, where, by the nominalization of a concept we mean a
projection (or hypostatization) of the concept's intensional content into the
domain of objects.
Predicable concepts, in other words, are not the intensional abstract ob-
jects (if any) that are denoted by nominalized predicates as abstract singu-
lar terms. For example, the predicable concepts that we exercise in saying
29HST is in fact consistent relative to weak Zermelo set theory, and it is equipollent to
the theory of simple types.
10
of someone that she is wise, kind, and beautiful, or of a black cube that
it is cubical and black, are distinguished in this way from the intensional
properties of being wise, being kind, being beautiful, being cubical and
being blacki.e. the properties wisdom, kindness, beauty, cubicity, and
blacknesswhich conceptually we grasp through the concepts by means of
the process of nominalization.30 In conceptualism, as we understand it here,
predicable concepts are intersubjectively realizableand in that sense objec-
tivecognitive capacities, or cognitive structures based upon such capacities,
to characterize and relate objects in various ways. Some, but not all, pred-
icable concepts may be initially based on experience, and some might even
precede the initial acquisition of language. But, as expressed in natural lan-
guage, regardless of how they are connected with experience, all predicable
concepts are the cognitive capacities that underlie our rule-following abilities
for the correct use of predicate expressions. In other words, predicable con-
cepts are those features of thought and communication that determine the
truth conditions that predicate expressions have in dierent possible contexts
of use. It is through the exercise of these capacities that our mental acts,
and therefore our speech acts as well, are informed with a predicable nature.
As cognitive capacities that can be exercised by dierent people at the
same time, as well as by the same person at dierent times, concepts in gen-
eral have an unsaturated nature, which is similar to but not the same as
Frege's notion of unsaturatedness, and which is the basis of our understand-
ing of predicable concepts as universals. The joint exercise of a referential
and a predicable concept, as in the expression of a categorical proposition,
does not result in a truth value (or an intensional propositional object), but
in a judgment, i.e. a mental act (event), and a speech act if expressed overtly.
The concepts are not themselves constituents of the judgment or speech act,
i.e. they are not components (objects) of that act (as an event), but rather
are the determinants that inform the act with a referential and a predicable
nature. In this regard, concepts are not objects (values of the bound indi-
vidual variables), though the exercise of a referential and predicable concept
results in an object, namely, a speech or mental act.
A nominalized predicate, accordingly, cannot denote the concept the pred-
30We speak of the intensional content of a predicable concept as a property here in
conformity with traditional use. These properties, or intensions, it should be noted, are
not the same as the properties of conceptual natural realism, which for us are unsatu-
rated causal structures that are realized as the nexuses of possible states of aairs. See
Cocchiarella [1996], 5, for more on this distinction.
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icate stands for in its role as a predicate, if it denotes anything at all. That
a nominalized predicate does denote, and, in particular, that it denotes the
intension or intensional content of the concept the predicate stands for, is
an assumption that leads from conceptualism to conceptual intensional real-
ism.31 Here, by the intension or intensional content of a concept we under-
stand the truth conditions determined by the concept in its dierent possible
contexts of use; and that the intensions of some concepts, such as that ex-
pressed by the Russell predicate, cannot be object ied, i.e. reied as objects
that are values of the bound individual variables, means that those truth
conditions would lead to a contradiction if such intensions were to exist as
objects (i.e. as values of the bound individual variables). Such a result does
not aect the status of those concepts as concepts, nor of their intensional
content, i.e. the truth conditions they determine; rather, it only means that
those truth conditions cannot be reied as objects. The intensions of most
concepts, or at least those used in ordinary thought and communication, can
be object ied, however, without leading a contradiction.32
Traditionally, these reied intensional contents have been called platonic
forms, because it was Plato who rst argued for their existence, but in the
sense of being part of a timeless realm that is independent of the natural
world, and therefore independent of the evolution of consciousness. It is the
notion of such a timeless realm, and of platonic forms as part of such a realm,
that is rejected by nominaliststhough their rejection of abstract entities ap-
plies even to moderate realism, which assumes that universals exist only
in things, and hence only in time. There is an alternative, however, which
amounts to a naturalized platonism, which we call conceptual intensional
realism. On this account, our cognitive access and subsequent knowledge
of all abstract objects is possible only by means of our concepts. That is,
it is only by starting out from concepts as cognitive capacities that we are
able to conceptually grasp and understand the contents of those concepts as
abstract objects; and the primary mechanism by which we are able to do this
31Denotation in conceptual realism is not the same as reference, it should be noted. In
particular, whereas reference (described in section 6 below) is a pragmatic notion that
applies to speech and mental acts, denotation is a semantic notion that is involved in the
evaluation of truth conditions. That a singular term a fails to denote (in a given context)
means that :(9y)(a = y) is true (in that context), where y is an individual variable not
occurring free in a.
32The axiom for positing such intensional objects in HST is (9=HSCP

 ), as described
in Cocchiarella [1986].
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is the conceptual analogue of nominalization. Of course, once nominaliza-
tion becomes institutionalized in natural language and the intensions of our
concepts are objectied by this mechanism, we may go on to use abstract sin-
gular terms other than nominalized predicatessuch as, e.g., numerals and
other mathematical expressions in our theoretical account of mathematical
entities33though, in the end, all abstract objects are based in one way or
another on our ability to form concepts as cognitive capacities.
But abstract objects, as we understand them here, are not only episte-
mologically dependent on the concepts by which they are grasped; rather,
they also have their being in the concepts whose intensions they are, or those
intensions they are ultimately based upon. All abstract objects, on this ac-
count, which include the propositional contents of our myths and scientic
theories as well as the intensions of the concepts exercised in our speech and
mental acts, are products of the evolution of consciousness, language and
culture, including in particular the evolution and development of the forms
of nominalization in language and thought. Abstract objects do not pre-
exist the evolution of consciousness, in other words, but depend essentially
upon it, even though they subsequently come to have a certain amount of
autonomy and come to play a role in the further evolution of culture.34
4 Ockham's Early theory of Ficta as Inten-
sional Objects
The ontology of intensional objects, or naturalized platonism, we have de-
scribed above would seem to be in conict with the nominalism commonly
associated with Ockham and the terminist logicians. Ockham, for example,
clearly rejected the platonist interpretation of nominalized predicates; but
that is because he associated it with a platonist or realist theory of predi-
cation. On this theory, a person is said to be wise, for example, because he
33See Cocchiarella [1989], 4, for an explanation of how the natural numbers are initially
constructed through a correlation rst of numerical quantier phrases with predicable
concepts and then by a nominalization of the latter.
34The naturalized platonism we have in mind here is similar to Karl Popper's theory
of what he calls the third world, or the world of objective contents of thought, which he
distinguishes from the rst world of physical objects and physical states and a second
world of mental states, including dispositions to act. See Popper [1967], p.106, and P2 of
Popper and Eccles [1983].
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exemplies the quality or property denoted by `wisdom'. That is, a predi-
cation of the form `x is wise' is explained on the basis of a supposedly more
basic sentence of the form `x exemplies wisdom', which means that signi-
cation in the sense in which `wise' signies wise individuals is not a basic
semantic notion after all.35
This is not how intensional objects are understood in conceptual realism,
however, where predication (as described below) is explained in terms of the
mutual saturation of a referential and predicable concept in a speech or men-
tal act. Intensional objects, as we have said, are products of language and
culture that do not pre-exist the evolution of consciousness, and, as such,
can in no sense be the basis of a realist theory of predication. Something
like a (modal moderate) realist theory of predication is part of conceptual
natural realism, but the natural kinds and properties that are part of that
theory are not objects, and therefore they are not the intensional objects
denoted by nominalized predicates. Natural kinds, for example, are unsat-
urated causal structures that are the basis of causal laws; and they become
saturated only as the nexuses of states of aairs. A terminist logician, such as
Ockham (reconstructed somewhat as described below), would have rejected
the (empirical) posits of conceptual natural realismalthough another ter-
minist logician, such as Burley, might well have accepted thembut Ockham
could have accepted the intensional objects of conceptual intensional realism,
just as he once accepted cta as intentional objects.36
Ockham, in other words, did accept something like our account of inten-
sional objects in his early view of concepts as cta.37 On this view, which
is sometimes called the ctum theory, concepts are the intentional objects
of acts of intellection (e.g. judgments). Ficta were not regarded as inde-
pendently real entities, but were said to have only an intentional being
(esse objectivum), according to which their being is their being cognized.38
35See Loux [1974], p.6.
36For a description how the empirical posits of conceptual natural realism are formulated,
see Cocchiarella [1996], 5-6. The same logistic formulation of natural realism would apply
to Ockham as to Burley, incidentally, except that Burley would have accepted the thesis
that some concepts have a natural kind, or a natural property, corresponding to them,
whereas Ockham would have denied (negated) that thesis.
37Spade [1996], p.154, and Normore [1990], p.59, for a description of Ockham's ctum
theory.
38Spade [1996], p.156. Marilyn McCord Adams prefers to speak of Ockham's early
view of concepts as the objective existence theory. She objects to calling such objects
cta, apparently because sometimes the intentional objects thought about are real and
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Ficta included not only universals, such as humanity and triangularity, but
also logical objects, such as propositions (in the modern sense), and ctitious
objects, such as chimeras and goatstags, and also impossible objects, such as
the round square.39 These are just the sort of objects that are accounted for
in conceptual realism as intensional objects, which suggests that the latter
might not really be so alien to Ockham's ontology after all, even if he later
changed his mind about cta.40
Ockham described his earlier view of concepts as intentional objects in
his Reportatio, where he made a distinction between two kinds of mental
language. One was Mental as we have described it so far, and the other was
a language whose terms were the mental representations of the spoken ex-
pressions of natural language itself, i.e. a mental language that is posterior
to spoken language, and therefore based on spoken language.41 This view
of cta is not unlike our view of intensional objects in conceptual realism,
where conceptual nominalization and the object ication, or reication, of
these objects is posterior to linguistic nominalization both in the historical
development of language and in the conceptual development of individuals
in their acquisition and use of language.
Of course, Ockham gave up his early theory of concepts as cta in favor of
his later theory of concepts as mental acts (intellectiones). But that does not
mean that the role cta played in explaining how we can think about unreal
objects can now be explained by concepts as mental acts; and, in fact, we
maintain they cannot, and that something like ctanamely, the intensional
objects of conceptual realismare needed to fulll this role. Ontologically,
cta and the intensional objects of conceptual realism are similar in the way
they depend upon concepts; for just as cta, as intentional objects, had their
being in being cognized in the mental acts that Ockham later identied with
concepts, so too intensional objects similarly have their being in the concepts
not ctitious things ([1977], pp.151f). Our concern here, however, is not with intentional
objects as such, whether real or ctitious, but with Ockham's early theory of cta as a
way of seeing why the intensional objects of conceptual realism can be accomodated in a
reconstructed version of terminist logic.
39See Adams [1977], p.147. T.K. Scott, [1966a], p.16, notes that Gregory of Rimini
argued for propositions (in the modern sense), or what he called enunciables (enuntia-
bile), which were denoted by innitive or gerundive expressions that amounted in eect to
nominalized sentences. These enunciables, like the abstract objects of conceptual realism,
were real, but not existent, objects.
40For an analysis of the round square as a ctum, see Cocchiarella [1996], 7.
41Normore [1990], p.59.
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whose intensions they are. Ockham was right in his rejection of concepts as
cta, but wrong in then rejecting cta altogether. They have a role to play in
mathematics and the semantics of ction, and stories and theories in general;
and, perhaps even more importantly, as we will see, in the semantics of those
concepts that intensional verbs (such as `seek', `promise', `owe', etc.) stand
for, as well as in our conceptualist theory of predication for concepts based
on relations in general, including the copula. Our proposal here is to take
the intensional objects of conceptual realism as a logical reconstruction of
Ockham's early theory of cta as intentional objects.
5 Ockham's Later Theory of Concepts as Men-
tal Acts
Ockham's later theory of concepts, which is sometimes called the intellectio
or mental-act theory, does not identify concepts with intentional objects,
but with mental acts themselves, i.e. with actual mental occurrences.42 The
common-name concept man, for example, is the very act of thinking of
men43; that is, as a mental occurrence, that very act signies all men. This
theory is similar to contemporary nominalism where, e.g., an actual spoken
linguistic token of the word `man' is said be true of all men, but as a matter
of convention only, and not because there is a natural likeness between the
word and men.
One problem with the mental-act theory is how the same concept, e.g.,
man, can be common to all humans as a term of Mental. That is, if a person's
concept man is just a mental act (event) of that person, and one person's
mental act is never the same as another's (or of the same person at another
time), then how can the same concept man be common to dierent people (or
to the same person at dierent times)? The answer that was given, appar-
ently, is that although one person's concept man is numerically dierent
from another person's concept mani.e. their mental acts of thinking of
men are dierent mental eventsnevertheless, the two concepts are exact
duplicates of one another.44 But in what sense can the mental acts of two
or more people, or of the same person at dierent times, be exact duplicates




of one another? Is it because there is an assumed natural likeness between
concepts and the things they signify, i.e. that one person's concept man will
then have a natural likeness with another person's concept man (or with
the same person's concept man at a dierent time)? If so, then, for reasons
already given against the supposed natural likeness between concepts and
the things they signify, this is an answer not acceptable today, or at least not
for conceptual realism as we understand it here.
Ockham does suggest an alternativenamely, that concepts as mental
acts are qualities of the mind, and in particular qualities that exist only
when a mind is exercising the mental act in question, as in moderate realism
(but restricted to qualities that inhere only in minds45). Dierent mental
acts of thinking of men are then just dierent instances of a mind's having
the same quality.46 This version of the mental act theory is sometimes called
the quality theory of concepts, according to which the concept is a real
quality inhering in the mind just like any other real property.47 This theory
might explain how the same concept can be exercised in two actual mental
actsnamely, by being the same mental quality inhering in the mind or
minds whose acts they arebut it doesn't account for concepts that are in
fact never exercised and that we nevertheless tacitly know or have in our
conceptual repertoiree.g., concepts of very large numbers. Also, it is not
clear how a concept as a quality inhering in a mind only when it is exercised
can explain how the mind can exercise that concept, nor how it might inform
the act with a referential or predicable nature.
Our proposal is to reconstruct, or replace, Ockham's theory of concepts
as mental qualities with the theory of concepts as cognitive capacities that we
have described above for conceptual realism. Concepts in this sense do not
have an existence independently of the more general capacity that humans
have for language and thought, and yet, as capacities that are intersubjec-
tively realizable, they are objective in at least as strong a sense as Ockham's
notion of a natural likeness between concepts and what they signifybut
without the problems the latter notion raises. Also, as the rule-following
capacities underlying our use of predicate and referential expressions in nat-
ural languages, concepts have by their very nature the function of informing
45Why a moderate realism restricted to mental qualities should be acceptable, but not
a moderate realism that applied to the external world as well, is an issue we leave to
others to explainif it can be explained at all.
46Spade [1996], p.155, and Adams [1977], p.145.
47Spade [1996], p.155.
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a speech or mental act with a predicable or referential nature; and, of course,
they are the very same capacities that are exercised in the production of
those speech and mental acts. Finally, the unsaturated nature of a concept
explains its non-occurrent, or quasi-dispositional statusthat is, its status as
a capacity that could, but need not, be exercised in an appropriate context,
or, that might in fact never be exercised at all.
6 Reference in Conceptual Realism
Reference in conceptual realism is a pragmatic notion that applies only when
referential concepts are exercised in speech or mental acts. Reference in ter-
minist logic is also a pragmatic notion, but applies to the way categorematic
terms are said to supposit for the things they signify when used in a speech or
mental act. Both systems distinguish reference to concepts from reference to
things, but only conceptual realism is explicit in distinguishing reference to
concepts in terms of predicate quantiers. Reference to concepts in terminist
logic, which is called simple supposition, does not explicitly involve predicate
quantiers, but this might be a matter only of surface grammar.48 In any
case, our concern here will be with reference to things, which in terminist
logic is called personal supposition.
Personal supposition in terminist logic is not the same as reference to
things in conceptual realism, because (as we explain in 9 below) categore-
matic terms can have personal supposition either as subjects or predicates
of categorical propositions, whereas referential concepts in conceptual real-
ism can never function as predicable concepts, nor can predicable concepts
function as referential concepts. Nevertheless, except for the so-called merely
confused personal supposition of predicates containing an intensional verb or
modal operator, the personal supposition of terms in categorical propositions
does coincide with a combined notion of activated and deactivated reference
in conceptual realism, where deactivated reference is involved in the truth
conditions determined by a predicable concept. Both systems, moreover, give
a uniform account of general and singular reference to things.
Like predicable concepts, referential concepts in conceptual realism are
unsaturated cognitive structures; but the structures are not the same. Rather,
48There is also another type of supposition, material supposition, in which a term stands
for itself or other spoken or written signs. We will not deal with this type of supposition
here.
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like the way that quantier phrases have a structure that is complementary
to predicate expressions, or the way that noun phrases are complementary
to verb phrases, referential concepts and predicable concepts are cognitive
structures that are complementary to one another. This complementarity is
such that when they are exercised together in a speech or mental act each
saturates the other; and just as the predicable concept is what informs that
act with a predicable nature, so too the referential concept is what informs
the act with a referential nature. Thus, for example, an armative assertion
that is analyzable in terms of a noun phrase and a verb phrase (regardless
of the complexity of either) is semantically analyzable in terms of an overt
application of a referential concept with a predicable concept; and the as-
sertion itself, as a speech act, is the result of the mutual saturation of their
complementary structures in that act. It is just this sort of mutual saturation
of complementary cognitive structures that constitutes the nexus of predica-
tion in conceptualism. It is also what accounts for the unity of a speech or
mental act, i.e. of an assertion or judgment, a problem that Ockham, who
anticipated F.H. Bradley's innite regress argument, was unable to resolve.49
Ockham, for example, assumed that a judgment that every man is an animal
was literally made up of a universal quantier, the concept man, the mental
copula is, and the concept animal.50 But then what unies these mental
terms into a single unied mental act? A fth mental term that tied these
items together would need a sixth to tie it with the others, which in turn
would need a seventh, and so on ad innitum. That is not how a judgment
or assertion is understood in conceptual realism, where concepts, as unsat-
urated cognitive structures, are not objects, and therefore cannot be actual
constituents of a mental act (event).51
Referential concepts, as we have indicated, are what the quantier phrases
of our logistic system stand for when the latter are axed to the symbolic
counterparts of names, where both proper and common names are under-
49See Spade [1996], chapter 4, 3.
50Ibid., p.123. Spade points out that not all terminists agreed with Ockham, and Buri-
dan as well, on this view of judgments or mental propositions as complexes of syncategore-
matic and categorematic mental terms. Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly, in particular,
criticized the view, and argued instead that judgments, or mental propositions, unlike the
assertions of spoken language, were structureless mental acts that occur, as it were,
all at once. This view is similar to the notion of a judgment or assertion in conceptual
realism, and might well be reconstructed in terms of the latter.
51On our account of predication as the mutual saturation of a referential and predicable
concept, there cannot be even a rst step toward Bradley's innite regress.
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stood to have such counterparts, just as they do in Mental, the language of
thought of terminist logic. For convenience, we refer to the symbols as proper
or common names as well. A proper name is distinguished in the system from
common names by a meaning postulate to the eect that at most one thing
can be referred to by that name, and that the name refers to the same thing
in every possible world in which it refers to anything at all.52 A proper name
may be used with or without existential presupposition, a topic we will re-
turn to later. Common names are the counterparts of common nouns, which
include sortal common nouns (such as `man', `tree', `chair', etc.) whose use
in thought and communication is associated with certain specic identity
criteria, as well as such non-sortal common nouns as `thing', `object', etc.
whose use is not associated with any specic identity criteria. Both kinds of
common nouns stand for common-name concepts. Names, whether proper or
common are dierent from predicate expressions, as Geach has pointed out,
because they can be used in simple acts of naming outside the context of
a sentence.53 Naming is not the same as referring, it should be emphasized,
because the latter is an act that does not occur outside the (implicit if not
explicit) context of a sentence used in a speech act, i.e. independently of an
associated act of predicating.
When used to refer in an assertion, a name occurs, as we have said, as
part of a quantier phrase. For example, when the common name `raven' of
English is used in an assertion to refer to every raven, or to some raven, then
in the logical form representing the assertion in question the symbolic coun-
terpart of `raven'which, for convenience, we will take to be `Raven'will
be axed to a universal, or an existential, quantier (indexed by a individual
variable), respectively. Thus, an assertion that every raven is black will be
symbolically represented by (8xRaven)Black(x), or, using a -abstract, by
(8xRaven)[xBlack(x)](x), where, again for convenience, we use `Black' as
the symbolic counterpart of the English predicate adjective `black'. The sym-
52Using the notation described below, a symbolic name, S, can be stipulated to be a
proper namea stipulation we abbreviate as PN(S)as follows:
PN(S) =df (8xS)((8yS)(y = x) ^[E!(x)! (9yS)(x = y)]);
where E! stands for the concept of concrete existence. Proper names of concrete objects
can be assumed to be vacuous in any world in which those objects do not exist. The
second conjunct is vacuously true in the case of abstract objects, because, on conceptual
grounds, no abstract object exists concretely.
53[1980], p.52.
20
bolic counterpart of `Some raven is not black', with the negation understood
to be internal to the predicate, is represented as (9xRaven)[x:Black(x)](x).
In each case, the quantier phrase stands for the referential concept that is
being exercised in the speech act in question, and the predicate expression
stands for the predicable concept of being-black, or being-not-black. The no-
tation is logically perspicuous in the way it represents the cognitive structure
of each assertion as the mutual saturation of the referential and predicable
concepts in question, analogous to the way that the corresponding quantier
and predicate expressions mutually saturate each other syntactically.
Denials, or negative assertions, are equivalent to armative assertions
in which the negation is internal to the predicate; but they do not have
the same cognitive structure. Thus, for example, an assertion of `No raven
is white' is really a denial that some raven is white, which, using an ex-
ternal negation, we symbolize as :(9xRaven)White(x).54 The equivalent
armative assertion, namely that every raven is such that it is not white
is symbolized as (8xRaven)[x:White(x)](x). Despite their logical equiv-
alence, and therefore their having the same truth conditions, the assertions
have dierent cognitive structures, which it is important to distinguish in a
perspicuous representation of our speech and mental acts. In the denial or
negative assertion, for example, the referential concept that the quantier
phrase `(9xRaven)' stands for has been deactivated, by which we mean in
part that no reference to a raven is involved in such an assertion, whereas
the quantier phrase in the equivalent armative assertion stands for a ref-
erential concept that has been activated, i.e. exercised in the speech act
in question.55
The objectual quantier phrases (8x) and (9x) (and their rewrite vari-
ants), which are already present in our system, are assumed to be abbreviated
versions of (8xObject) and (9xObject), where `object' is assumed to be syn-
onymous with `thing', and hence where these phrases may also be read as
54`No raven is white' is obtained through a transformation of `There is no raven that is
white', which in turn is a transformation of `It is not the case that there is a raven that is
white', or, equvalently, of `[That there is a raven that is white] is not the case'.
55The deactivation is more explicit in `[That some raven is white]NP [is not the case]V P ',
where the sentence `some raven is white' is nominalized. We could symbolize this as
Not([(9xRaven)White(x)]);
where `Not' is a one-place predicate read as `is not the case'. We use the standard notation
instead for convenience.
21
`everything' and `something', respectively. The fact that assertions of the
form `Every S is F ' and `Some S is F ' have the same truth conditions as
assertions of the form `Everything is such that if it is an S, then it is F ' and
`Something is an S and it is also F ' is captured in the following meaning
postulates:
(8xS)F (x)$ (8x)[x((9yS)(x = y)! F (x))](x);(MP1)
(9xS)F (x)$ (9x)[x((9yS)(x = y) ^ F (x))](x):(MP2)
Despite their logical equivalence, however, the assertions in question do not
have the same cognitive structure, a fact that is perspicuously represented in
our notation.56
Complex common names are generated in English from more basic com-
mon names by attaching a (dening) relative clause to the latter. We adopt
an analogous procedure in our logic by introducing an operator `=', which
generates a (complex) name by taking a name and a formula as arguments.
Thus, where S is a name and ' is a formula, then `S='' is a (complex)
name, read as `S (who, which) that is (are) ''. For example, a symbolic
representation of an assertion of `Every citizen (who is) over 21 is eligible to
vote', which has the complex common name `citizen (who is) over 21' as its
grammatical subject, can now be given perspicuously as
(8xCitizen=Over-21(x))Eligible-to-V ote(x):
The reference in this assertion is to every citizen who is over 21, and not
just to citizens, as it would have been had one asserted the dierent, but
equivalent sentence, `Every citizen is such that if he is over 21, then he is
eligible to vote', which is symbolized as
(8xCitizen)[x(Over-21(x)! Eligible-to-V ote(x))](x):
To account for the logical equivalence of these sentences, and others like
them, we assume the following as meaning postulates (where S is a variable
for names, F is a one-place predicate variable, and ' a formula):
(8xS=')F (x)$ (8xS)['! F (x)];(MP3)
(9xS=')F (x)$ (9xS)[' ^ F (x)]:(MP4)
56Strictly speaking, the -abstracts in (MP1) and (MP2) cannot represent the exer-
cise of a predicable concept, because the quantier phrase (9yS) in each has not been
deactivated. Deactivation in these cases involves the copula, Is, discussed in 8 below.
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7 Active Versus Deactivated Reference
We noted above that in denials, or negative assertions, the referential concept
that the quantier phrase stands for has been deactivated, and that in fact no
reference is really being made in such assertions. The notion of a deactivated
referential concept, or deactivated reference, is fundamental to the theory of
reference in conceptual realism.57 A basic thesis of this theory, for example,
is that a referential concept is never part of what informs a speech or mental
act with a predicable nature, but functions only as what informs such an act
with a referential nature, i.e., as what accounts for that act's intentionality
or aboutness. Every basic assertion, as expressed by a noun phrase and a
verb phrase, is the result of applying just one referential concept and one
predicable concept. This means that a quantier phrase that occurs as part
of a complex predicate of a sentence that is used in an assertion does not stand
for the referential concept that it stands for when it is used as a grammatical
subject. In such a context, the referential concept that such a quantier
phrase stands for has been deactivated. What the quantier phrase stands
for in such a context, according to another basic thesis of our theory, is
the intensional content of the referential concept it stands for when used as a
grammatical subject. Thus, an applied predicable concept that is represented
in natural language by a complex predicate in which a referential (quantier)
expression occurs is not formed on the basis of the referential concept that
that referential expression stands for, but on the basis of the intensional
content of that referential concept.
By the intensional content of a referential concept we mean the intensional
object that is specied through a two-step process in which the referential
concept is rst transformed into (i.e. correlated with) a predicable concept,
which is then transformed, by nominalization, into the intensional content of
the latter. This double transformation (correlation), or nominalization,
of a referential concept, represented by a quantier phrase (QxS), into its
intensional content, represented by [QxS], is dened as follows58:
[QxS] =df [x(9F )(x = F ^ (QxS)F (x))]:
57A deactivated referential concept, it should be noted, is not a referential concept (just
as a dead man is not a man); rather, as we explain below, it is the intensional content of
the referential concept in question.
58Strictly speaking, the denition given is of the predicate determined by the quantier
phrase (QxS); and it is this predicate that can then be nominalized.
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In using this notation, we assume that any quantier phrase that occurs
within an abstract singular term, i.e. within a nominalized complex predicate
expression (which is represented by a -abstract in our system) has been
deactivated and does not represent an active use of the referential concept
the phrase otherwise stands for.
To take a well-known example from Richard Montague, consider a context
in which the sentence `John seeks a unicorn' is asserted (and in which the
name `John' is used with existential presupposition).59 The speaker in this
context purports to refer only to John, and not to a unicorn, which means
that the referential concept that the quantier phrase `a unicorn' stands for
has been deactivated. The logical form representing this assertion in our
system is:
(9xJohn)[xSeek(x; [9yUnicorn])](x):
The same analysis applies to an assertion of `John nds a unicorn', the logical
form of which is:
(9xJohn)[xF ind(x; [9yUnicorn])](x):
Despite their having the same logical form, there is a dierence in what
follows from these two assertions. This is because the transitive verb `nd' is
extensional in its range, as well as in its domain, whereas the transitive verb
`seek' is extensional only its domain. This means that the following meaning
postulate is implicit in the use of `nd'60:
[xF ind(x; [Qy S])] = [x (Qy)Find(x; y)]:
It is because of this implicit meaning postulate that one can argue validly
as follows:
John nds a unicorn; therefore, a unicorn is found by John.
59See Montague [1974], pp.266f. Our analysis of quantier phrases that occur as parts
of predicates (verb phrases) is similar to Montague's, except that Montague's intensional
logic is a sense-denotation theory of (simple) types based on a logical realist ontology.
60We use `Q' as a schema letter for determiners in general, which in addition to 8 and
9, include the symbolic counterparts of `most', `few', `the', etc., and counterparts of the
demonstrative pronouns `this' and `that'.
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And it is because no such meaning postulate is implicit in the use of `seek'
that the following argument is not valid:
John seeks a unicorn; therefore, a unicorn is sought by John.
The two arguments do not dier in the logical form, but in the kind of
relational concept involved in the formation of their respective predicable
concepts.
We should perhaps emphasize here that although
(9xJohn)[xF ind(x; [9yUnicorn])](x)$ (9xJohn)(9yUnicorn)Find(x; y)
is provable in our system (by -conversion and the above meaning postulate),
i.e. although the two sides of this biconditional represent the same truth
conditions, the formula on the right-hand side does not represent the form of a
speech or mental act. Only one referential concept can be activated in a basic
assertion, which means that the second quantier phrase on the right-hand
side must be deactivated, i.e. nominalized, before the formula can be taken
to represent the cognitive structure of a speech or mental act.61 This means
that not all of the logical forms of our theory can be taken as representing a
proposition of Mental. That is as it should be, we believe, because Mental was
intended to generate only mental propositions (as based perhaps on an ars
combinatoria for the analysis of concepts), and not also all of the deductive
logical machinery of a calculus ratiocinator.62 In other words, Mental is
not so much a logically perspicuous medium for the representation of truth
conditions as it is a logically perspicuous medium for the representation of
the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts.63 That logical forms
that do not represent the cognitive structure of our speech and mental acts
61It is possible to use a conjunctive referential concept, as in `John and a unicorn are
such that he nds it', which might be symbolized as:
(9xJohn ^ 9yUnicorn)Finds(x; y):
But we would still be using one referential concept in such a basic kind of assertion.
62Of course, our present system for conceptual realism goes well beyond the logical
resouces of terminist logic in a number of other ways as well. Our interest here is to recon-
struct terminist logic within conceptual realism, not to claim that the two are equivalent
systems.
63This is all the more obvious if truth conditions are cashed out in terms of a logic of
events and states of aairs, as is suggested in Cocchiarella [1997], 4.
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might be needed to account for the deductive relations between propositions
seems not to have been an issue ever considered by Ockham and the other
terminist logicians.
Another point that should be emphasized here is that the predicable con-
cepts that `seek a unicorn' and `nd a unicorn', and their symbolic counter-
parts, [xSeek(x; [9yUnicorn])] and [xF ind(x; [9yUnicorn])], stand for are
cognitive structures underlying our rule-following abilities in the use of these
verb phrases. These concepts are not a complex of a real relation and an
intensional object, and the assertions in question should not be interpreted
as asserting that a real relation holds between John and an intensional ob-
ject. That the predicable concepts are formed on the basis of the relational
concepts that `seek' and `nd' stand for, together with the intensional con-
tent of the referential concept that `a unicorn' stands for, means only that
the truth conditions determined by these predicable concepts are based on
these entities. And that the predicable concept that `nd a unicorn' stands
for is based on an extensional relation means that the contribution to those
truth conditions of the intensional content of `a unicorn' can be described in
an equivalent extensional way, i.e. as involving an actual unicorn.
8 The Identity Theory of the Copula
All predicable concepts formed on the basis of a relational concept are to be
analyzed as above when they are to be exercised in a speech or mental act.
This applies no less to the copula in its use to express an identity than it does
to transitive verbs such as `seek' and `nd'. But, because quantier phrases
occurring within a complex predicate do not stand for the referential concepts
they stand for when used as grammatical subjects, we need to distinguish
predicable concepts based upon the copula from those based on strict identity.
We introduce a new symbol, `Is', that we will use for this purpose, and note
that, like the transitive verb `nd', the copula Is is extensional in its range
as well as in its domain, except that in this case the copula becomes a strict
identity. The schematic meaning postulate for Is then is as follows:
[xIs(x; [QyS])] = [x(Qy)(x = y)]:
With 9 as a special case of the schematic determiner Q, we have
[xIs(x; [9yS])] = [x(9y)(x = y)]
26
as a particular meaning postulate or conceptual truth regarding the copula
Is. By means of this notation, we can perspicuously represent the cognitive
structure of an assertion of, e.g., `Socrates is a man' as follows (assuming
`Socrates' is being used with existential presupposition):
(9xSocrates)[xIs(x; [9yMan])](x);
which, by -conversion and the above meaning postulate, is equivalent to:
(9xSocrates)(9yMan)(x = y):
This last formula, however, unlike the one above, does not represent the
structure of a speech or mental act, although it does represent the same
truth conditions.
Something like this kind of analysis was involved in the so-called the two-
name theory, or the identity theory of the copula in terminist logic. Appar-
ently, Ockham and other terminists thought that every armative categorical
proposition amounted to asserting an identity between the personal suppo-
sitions of the subject and the predicate terms of the proposition, as, e.g., the
suppositions of the names `Socrates' and `man' in an assertion of `Socrates
is a man'. Negative judgments, on the other hand, amounted to a denial of
such an identity.64 As a result, the identity theory of the copula came to be
developed as a theory of the truth conditions of categorical propositions, a
theory that is now referred to as the doctrine of supposition proper.65
The personal suppositions of a proper or common name are the thing(s)
signied by that name, but, unlike signication, supposition is understood to
be relativized to the propositional context of a speech or mental act where a
quantier might occur with the name. That is why the theory of supposition
of terminist logic is really a theory of the truth conditions of categorical
propositions as linguistic or mental acts. These truth conditions, as we have
said, are determined by the identity theory of the copula together with the
quantiers that occur with the names.66 Thus, for example, an assertion of
64See Spade [1996], p.133, for a discussion of this old and venerable theory of the intel-
lect's composing and dividing of concepts in making armative or negative judgments,
where dividing is composing negatively.
65See Scott [1966], p.30, and Spade [1996], chapter 8, iii.
66Tense or modal modications of the copula will ampliate the personal supposition
of the terms, and in that way modify the truth conditions of the speech or mental act in
question. (See, e.g., Scott [1966], p.33, and Spade [1966], chapter 10.) For simplicity of
presentation, we restrict ourselves here to present tense uses of the copula.
27
`Some man is a thief', which on our analysis has the form
(9xMan)[xIs(x; [9yThief ])](x);
is equivalent, by -conversion and the above meaning postulate, to
(9xMan)(9yThief)(x = y);
which indicates that the truth conditions of this assertion amount to the
identity of some supposition of the term `man' with a supposition of the
term `thief', where each supposition, as a result of the quantiers attached
to the terms, amounts to a restriction on what on what the terms signify.67
Similarly, an assertion of `Every man is an animal', which on our analysis
has the form,
(8xMan)[xIs(x; [9yAnimal])](x);
is equivalent, by -conversion and the above meaning postulate, to
(8xMan)(9yAnimal)(x = y);
which indicates that the truth conditions of the assertion involve an identity
between each supposition of the categorical term `man' and some supposition
of the categorical term `animal', where, again each supposition is a restriction,
as determined by the quantiers attached to each term, of what they signify.68
The same kind of analysis also applies to categorical propositions ex-
pressed by means of a predicate adjective with the `is' of predication instead
67One way to construe the personal suppositions of `man' and `thief' here as a form
of reference (as is frequently claimed in the literature) is by noting that the assertion
that some man is a thief is equivalent to an assertion that some man and some thief are
identical,
(9xMan ^ 9yThief)[xy(x = y)](x; y);
i.e., where a conjunctive referential concept is used involving both `man' and `thief'.
68To reconstruct these suppositions as a form of reference, we can again use a con-
junctive referential concept to assert that each man and some animal are such that they
are identical:
(8xMan ^ 9yAnimal)[xy(x = y)](x; y);
which is equivalent to our original assertion.
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of the copula. An assertion of `Every swan is white', for example, which in
our framework is symbolized as (8xSwan)White(x), is not interpreted by the
terminists as an identity between swans and white, or whiteness, or white-
nesses (whatever any of these might be taken to be as objects). Rather, the
predicate adjective `white' is interpreted as an attributive adjective, so that to
say a thing is white is to say that it is a white thing.69 Predicate adjectives, in
other words, were analyzed by the terminists as attributive adjectives applied
to the common name `thing'.70 In conceptual realism, however, the common
name `white thing' is interpreted as the complex common name `thing that
is white', which is symbolized in our system as `Thing=White(x)' (or as
`Object=White(x)'). Thus, whereas the terminist logician would interpret
`Every swan is white' as `Every swan is a white thing', we can reconstruct
the terminists' analysis as `Every swan is a thing that is white', which can
be symbolized as follows:
(8xSwan)[xIs(x; [9yThing=White(y)])](x):
This formula, by -conversion and the above meaning postulate, has the
same truth conditions as
(8xSwan)(9yThing=White(y))(x = y);
which, in terms of supposition theory, is to say that each supposition of
the common name `swan' is identical with a supposition of the (complex)
common name `thing that is white', or, more simply, with the common name
`white thing'.
Negative categorical sentences such as `No raven is white' are interpreted
as denials or negations, as we have already said. That is, to assert that no
raven is white is to deny that some raven is white: :(9xRaven)White(x),
which is provably equivalent to denying that some raven is a white thing;
i.e.,
:(9xRaven)White(x) $ :(9xRaven)[xIs(x; [9yThing=White(y)])](x)
69See Normore [1985], p.194.
70It is not clear if in some cases it is a common name subordinate to `thing'. E.g. in
asserting `Socrates is wise', are we asserting that Socrates is a wise man (or person), or
that Socrates is a wise thing?
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is provable in our system. But denying that some raven is a white thing is
equivalent, by -conversion and the above meaning postulate, to
:(9xRaven)(9yThing=White(y))(x = y);
which in terms of the theory of supposition describes the truth conditions as
a denial that some supposition of the common name `raven' is identical with
a supposition of the complex common name `thing that is white', or more
simply, with the common name `white thing'.
Finally, the logical form of a negative particular categorical sentence such
as `Some swan is not white', which is symbolized for us as
(9xSwan)[x:White(x)](x);
is understood in terminist logic as the equivalent statement that some swan
is not a white thing', which is symbolized as
(9xSwan)[x:Is(x; [9yThing=White(x)])](x):
This last formula, by -conversion and the above meaning postulate, is equiv-
alent to
(9xSwan)(8yThing=White(x))(x 6= y);
the truth conditions for which are that some supposition of the common
name `swan' is not identical with any supposition of the complex common
name `thing that is white'.
9 Ascending and Descending: The Way Up
is not Always the same as The Way Down
Supposition theory is not one theory but two. The rst, supposition theory
proper, is a theory of the truth conditions of categorical propositions as
described above. The second, called the doctrine of the modes of supposition,
has to do with how many things a categorematic term supposits for in a
given speech or mental act.71 This doctrine, despite the reference to modes
71Paul Spade, in [1996], p. 294, was the rst to propose this interpretationthough he
does not explain or develop it, as we do here, in terms of the principle of descent (described
in this section). T.K. Scott, in [1966], was the rst to distinguish the two doctrines, but
he claims that the second has to do with the elimination of quantiers (pp. 36f).
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of supposition, is not a theory about dierent ways of referring. Rather,
the modes are just dierent types and subtypes of personal supposition.
The two basic types are discrete and common supposition, and the purpose
of the theory is to explain, or reduce, the latter in terms of the former.72
Common supposition is divided into determinate and confused supposition as
subtypes, and the latter is further divided into the sub-subtypes of confused
and distributive supposition and merely confused supposition.73
A term is said to have discrete supposition in a categorical sentence only
if it is either a proper name, a demonstrative pronoun (such as `this' and
`that') or a common name preceded by a demonstrative pronoun (such as
`this man', `that horse', etc.). Terms that have discrete supposition are said
to be discrete terms, and categorical propositions in which they occur as the
grammatical subject are said to be singular propositions.74 The expla-
nation, or reduction, of the types (and subtypes) of common supposition
in terms of discrete supposition is given in terms of a descent to, and
sometimes an ascent from, singular propositions. A proper name such as
`Socrates' will have discrete supposition only when Socrates exists, however,
which means that even an assertion of `Socrates is Socrates' will be false when
Socrates does not exist.75 The situation is similar but not quite the same
in conceptual realism, where we distinguish between using a proper name
with existential presupposition and using it without such a presupposition.
Thus, if, in asserting `Socrates is Socrates', we are referentially using the
name `Socrates' with existential presupposition, the symbolic counterpart of
this assertion is (9xSocrates)[xIs(x; [9ySocrates])](x), in which case the
assertion is false if it is asserted at a time when Socrates does not exist, or so
we can assume.76 But if we are referentially using `Socrates' without existen-
72Spade [1996], p.277.
73Spade [1996], chapter 9.
74Spade [1996], p.276.
75Scott [1966], p.41.
76That is, a proper name, such as `Socrates', of a concrete, as opposed to an abstract,
object can be stipulated to be existence-entailing in the sense that if the name can be
used to refer to anything, then that thing exists (as a concrete object):
(8xSocrates)E!(x);
where E! stands for concrete existence, as opposed to being (the value of an individual vari-
able bound by 9). Note that the symbolic counterpart of `Socrates exists', where the name
`Socrates' is used only with existential presupposition, is (9xSocrates)E!(x). Denying that
Socrates exists, i.e. :(9xSocrates)E!(x), is then equivalent to (8xSocrates):E!(x), from
31
tial presupposition (which is usually not the case), the symbolic counterpart
of our assertion is (8xSocrates)[xIs(x; [9ySocrates])](x), which is not false
but vacuously true when Socrates does not exist.
This last point, of course, has to do with universal sentences not having
existential import, contrary to the way they were interpreted by medieval
logicians. That is, in conceptual realism, and in modern logic in general, uni-
versal conditionalsand therefore all sentences beginning with a universal
quantier phraseare true, and not false as interpreted by the terminists,
when their antecedents (subject terms) are vacuous.77 The utility of this
view, both for science and natural language, has been more than justied
over the last century; and we assume that its acceptance in our reconstruc-
tion of terminist logic is but a minor modication, and improvement, of this
systemjust as the acceptance of a logic free of existential presuppositions
for proper names and denite descriptions is a minor modication, and im-
provement, of so-called standard rst-order logic. We need only stipulate
when a name S is assumed to supposit something, i.e. when something is an
S, if existential import is needed to validate a descent or ascent, as it will be
in some cases.
Latin lacks a denite article, incidentally, which means that the terminists
did not consider denite descriptions in their analyses at all. We will not,
for that reason, go into the distinction between using denite descriptions
with, as opposed to without existential presuppositions.78 The existential
presuppositions of demonstrative phrases is a matter we cannot avoid, how-
which, together with the above stipulation about the name `Socrates', it follows that
Socrates does not have being when he does not exist, e.g., :(9xSocrates)(x = x). But,
because (9xSocrates)[xIs(x; [9ySocrates])](x) is provably equivalent to this last formula
without the negation, it then follows that it too is false when Socrates does not exist. (It
may be preferable, however, to allow that Socrates can exist, and in that sense have being,
even when he does not exist.)
77Note that by the meaning postulate (MP1) of 6,
(8xSocrates)[xIs(x; [9ySocrates])](x) $
(8x)[(9ySocrates)(x = y)! Is(x; [9ySocrates])];
is provable. The universal conditional on the right-hand side of this biconditional is vac-
uously true if :(9ySocrates)(x = y) is true for any value of x as bound by 8, which it is
when Socrates does not exist, or so we may assume (as already noted).
78See Cocchiarella [1989], 6, for a detailed account of this distinction. The truth con-
ditions for denite descriptions used with existential presuppositions are essentially those
described by Bertrand Russell.
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ever, because such demonstrative phrases are central to the descent to (and,
in some cases, ascent from) singular propositions. The term `man', for exam-
ple, has determinate supposition in `Socrates is a man', which means that the
descent (at a time when Socrates exists) to a certain disjunction of singulars,
`Socrates is this man or Socrates is that man or ... or Socrates is that man',
is validand so too is the ascent from the singulars to `Socrates is a man'
(again, at a time when Socrates exists), and therefore from their disjunction.
Because the demonstrative `that' can be used a number of times in a
disjunction, or conjunction, of singular propositions, we must, in our logi-
cal language, distinguish each use from the others.79 For convenience, we
will use `That1', `That2',..., `Thatn', etc. (for each positive integer n), as
variable-binding operators that operate on a common name (complex or
simple), resulting thereby in a quantier phrase that can then be applied
to a formula. We will also read `That1' as the English `this'. Thus, where
S is a common name (complex or simple), e.g., `Man=Snubnosed(x)', then
`(That2xMan=Snubnosed(x))', read as `that man who is snubnosed' (or as
`that snubnosed man'), is a quantier phrase of our symbolic language; and,
as such, the phrase stands for a referential concept. The symbolic analysis
of an assertion of `That man who is snubnosed is wise', which involves the
mutual saturation of a referential and a predicable concept, can now be given
a logically perspicuous representation as follows:
(That2xMan=Snubnosed(x))Wise(x):
We also interpret the use of `this' and `that' that occur without a common
name, as in `This is a dog', `That is man', etc., similar to the way we interpret
the objectual quantiers (8x) and (9x), i.e. as implicitly containing the
common name `thing' (or `object'), as in `This thing is a dog', `That thing is
a man', etc.
79Note that more than one referential concept can be exercised in a disjunction, or
conjunction, of singular propositions. The detective who says, while pointing to two
dierent men, `This man is the killer or that man is the killer' is exercising two dierent
referential concepts, expressed by `this man' and `that man', in his speech act (whereas, of
course, `the killer' is deactivated in both disjuncts). Similarly, when a school coach says,
while pointing to certain boys in his class, `That boy is on team A and ... and that boy
is on team A', he using the referential expression `that boy' to refer to a certain number
of dierent boys in his conjunctive statement. Conjunctive and disjunctive statements are
not basic statements, needless to say, and hence are not subject to the restriction that
only one referential, and one predicable, concept can be exercised in them.
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Now our point about the existential presupposition of a demonstrative
phrase is that when a speaker says, e.g., `That man is sitting', he is presup-
posing that the thing he is indicating is a man, i.e. that `That man is a man'
is true. But if the speaker is pointing to a manikin that he has mistaken
for a man, then his purported reference has failed, and both the speaker's
assertion and the sentence `That man is a man' are false in such a context.
A speaker's use of a demonstrative phrase, we maintain, is equivalent to, if
not synonymous with, a use with existential presupposition of a denite de-
scription; in particular, that a use of a demonstrative phrase, e.g., `that S',
where S is a complex or simple common name, is equivalent to using with
existential presupposition the denite description `the S that I am indicat-
ing'.80 A sentence of the form `The S is an S', where the denite description
is used with existential presuppositionas, e.g., in the implicit premise of
Descartes's ontological argument, `The perfect being is a perfect being'is
not a valid thesis; and, because of the equivalence between demonstrative
phrases and denite descriptions used with existential presuppositions, nei-
ther are sentences of the form `That S is an S'.81
Determinate supposition, we have said, means a descent to a certain dis-
junction of singulars. More specically, a common name S has determinate
supposition in a (categorical) proposition P if S occurs in P as part of a
quantier phrase and the descent from P to a disjunction of singular propo-
sitions (Q1 _ ::: _ Qn), where each Qi is obtained from P by replacing the
quantier phrase containing S by `thati S', is valid. To ensure validity, the
disjunction must be exhaustive of all the S there are (when P is asserted).
Thus, in the determinate supposition of `man' in `Socrates is a man' (asserted
when Socrates exists), which is symbolized as
(9xSocrates)[xIs(x; [9yMan])](x);
80We assume here that there can be no cases of correctly using a demonstrative phrase,
such as `that man', without existential presuppositionthe way there can be cases of
correctly using a denite description without existential presupposition.
The truth conditions for a sentence of the form `Thati S is F ' are the same as `There is
exactly one S that I am (now) indicating and it is F ', which can be symbolized as follows
(where `G(z)' abbreviates `I am indicating z'):
(ThatiyS)F (y)$ (9yS)[(8zS)(G(z)$ z = y) ^ F (y)]:
81`That S is an S' will be true in any context in which `Something is that S' is true; i.e.
when (9x)(ThatiyS)(x = y) is true.
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the descent, to be valid, cannot be to any disjunction of the form
(9xSocrates)[xIs(x; [That1yMan])](x) _ ::: _
_ (9xSocrates)[xIs(x; [ThatnyMan])](x);
but only to a disjunction that is exhaustive of all of the men there are, i.e.
of all the men who exist at the time of the assertion of `Socrates is a man'.
In other words, even after having indicated a number of men by means of a
demonstrative phrase, we may still not have indicated the man that in fact is
Socrates if we have not exhausted all of the men there are. Implicit in such
a descent, accordingly, is the assumption that we are indicating all the men
there are; that is, that
A thing is a man if, and only if, either
it is that1 man or ... or it is thatn man.
is true (at the time of assertion). A similar assumption applies to any com-
mon name, S, of concrete physical objects; that is, for some natural number
n, the terminist logicians assumed that at any given time there are exactly
n many things that are S.82 As a generalized version of the above thesis
for the common name `man', we will call this assumption, for any common
name S (complex or simple) of concrete things, and any natural number n,
the principle of descent for n many S, or simply PDn(S): The principle is
symbolized as follows83:
(8x)[Is(x; [9yS])$ Is(x; [That1yS]) _ ::: _ Is(x; [ThatnyS])]:
This thesis, by the meaning postulate for Is, is provably equivalent to
(8x)[(9yS)(x = y)$ (That1yS)(x = y) _ ::: _ (ThatnyS)(x = y)]:
It is important to note here that the thesis of descent amounts to an explicit
answer to the question of how many S there (now) are in terms of the identity
82The restriction must be to concrete physical objects, because the thesis will be false for
such abstract objects as the natural numbers, and perhaps also for concrete events (which
are not physical objects). Unlike the system of conceptual realism, terminist logic gave no
explanation of how such abstract objects as the natural numbers are to be accounted for.
83The principle is taken to apply at any moment of time considered as the present.
Related principles for ampliated terms are obtained by applying tense and modal operators
to PDn(S). (We ignore the assumption that ThatiyS 6= ThatjyS, for i; j  n where i 6= j,
incidentally, because it is not needed for the inferences noted here.)
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theory of the copula, which as we indicated earlier is what the doctrine of
the modes of supposition is really about.84
The principle of descent for `man', i.e. PDn(Man), also validates the
ascent (when Socrates exists) from any one of the singulars `Socrates is this
man', ..., `Socrates is thatn man' to the original proposition `Socrates is a
man' in which `man' is said to have determinate supposition. For this kind
of proposition, in other words, we can validly ascend when and only when
we can validly descend.
Determinate supposition applies to common names occurring as subject
terms as well as to common names occurring as predicate terms, as in our
example of `Socrates is a man'. Thus, by PDn(Man), we can validly descend
from `Some man is running' to `This man is running or that2 man is running
or ... or thatn man is running'; and of course we can ascend from any one of
these disjunctsand therefore from the disjunction as wellto the sentence
`Some man is running'. Similarly, by PDn(Man), we can validly descend
from `A man is not running' to `This man is not running or that2 man is
not running or ... or thatn man is not running'; and, again, we can similarly
ascend from any, or all, of these disjuncts to `A man is not running', or to
`Some man is not running', both of which are symbolized the same way in
our system. With determinate supposition, in other words, we can validly
descend on the basis of the principle of descent when, and only when we can
validly ascend on the basis of that principle.85
Confused and distributive supposition is more problematic than determi-
nate supposition, however, because, according to Ockham, a common name
will have confused and distributive supposition in a categorical proposition
only when one can descend to a conjunction of singulars, but cannot as-
cend from any one singular in the conjunction.86 The problem is that such
84When n is 0, we take the right-hand side of the biconditional within the scope of (8x)
to be the formula (x 6= x), from which it follows that nothing is S, which is as it should
be when n is 0.
Note, incidentally, that when something is an S, i.e. (9x)Is(x; [9yS]), then, by PDn(S)
and distribution of (9x) over _, each disjunct will have the form (9x)Is(x; [ThatiyS]),
which, in eect, stipulates that the existential presupposition of the demontrative phrase
is fullled, i.e. that something is thati S.
85The argument for the general claim is based on specic examples, to be sure; but that
is because the examples can be easily schematized and shown to hold in general.
86There is a problem with this characterization when applied to the predicate of a neg-
ative particular proposition, however, because, although the descent is to a conjunction,
the conjuncts will not be singular propositions. But then each conjunct can in turn be
36
a descent is valid only when each conjunct can be truthfully asserted if the
original premise is true, and hence only when the existential presupposi-
tion of the demonstrative phrase in that conjunct is fullled, i.e. only when
(9x)Is(x; [ThatiyS]) is true for each i such that 1  i  n, where S is the
common name in question and there are exactly n many S. This, as it turns
out, is just the issue of existential import, but as applied to demonstrative
phrases in particular. Such presuppositions were implicit in what Ockham
and the terminist logicians assumed for this type of supposition.
The common name `man' in `Every man is an animal', for example,
will have confused and distributive supposition by the principle of descent
PDn(Man), but only if the existential presuppositions in question are ful-
lled.87 If these presuppositions are fullled, then, by PDn(Man), one can
validly descend from `Every man is an animal' to the conjunction `This man
is an animal and that2 man is an animal and ... and thatn man is an animal',
i.e. to
(That1xMan)[xIs(x; [9yAnimal])](x) ^ ::: ^
^ (ThatnxMan)[xIs(x; [9yAnimal])](x):
One cannot validly ascend, as Ockham says, from any one of these singulars
to the universal `Every man is an animal'; but, clearly, given PDn(Man),
one can validly ascend to the universal from the whole conjunction.
Confused and distributive supposition was assumed by the terminists to
apply not only to the subject term of a universal armative, but to the
subject term of a universal negative categorical proposition as well. But,
reduced by determinate supposition to a disjunction of singulars. Thus, on our charac-
terization, a common name S has confused and distributive supposition in a proposition
P if S occurs in P as part of a quantier phrase and the descent from P to a conjunction
(Q1 ^ :::^Qn) is valid, where each Qi (whether singular or otherwise) is obtained from P
by replacing the quantier phrase containing S by `thati S'.
87All that follows from PDn(Man) and (8xMan)Is(x; [9yAnimal]), using (MP1) of 6,
is the conjunction that [if anything is that1 man, then it is an animal] and ... and [if
anything is thatn man, then it is an animal], i.e.
(8x)[Is(x; [That1yMan])! Is(x; [9yAnimal])] ^ ::: ^
(8x)[Is(x; [ThatnyMan])! Is(x; [9yAnimal])]:
Hence, if all universals were assumed to have existential import, then the existential pre-
suppositions of these demonstrative phrases would be fullled. That is why we have said
that this is just the issue of existential import, but as applied to demonstrative phrases.
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again, the descent will be valid only if the existential presuppositions of
the demonstrative phrases in the conjunction in question have been fullled.
Consider, for example, the same common name `man', only now occurring as
the subject of a universal negative categorical, such as `No man is running'.
The confused and distributive supposition of `man' in this proposition means
that, by PDn(Man), one can descend from this sentence to `This man is not
running and that2 man is not running and ... and thatn man is not running'
(with the negation in each conjunct internal to the predicate). But, as in our
previous example, the descent will be valid only when (9x)Is(x; [ThatiyS])
is true for each i such that 1  i  n.
In our reconstruction, we note rst that `No man is running' is un-
derstood as denying that some man is running, which is symbolized as
:(9xMan)Running(x), but which is provably equivalent to (8xMan):Running(x).
By this last sentence and PDn(Man), it follows that anything that is that1
man or ... thatn man is not running, i.e.
(8x)[(That1yMan)(x = y) _ ::: _ (ThatnyMan)(x = y)! :Running(x)];
and from this and (9x)Is(x; [ThatiyMan]), for 1  i  n, the desired con-
junction,
(That1yMan)[y:Running(x)](x) ^ ::: ^ (ThatnyMan)[y:Running(x)](x)
follows.88 The same argument can be made in reverse order, moreover, which
means that, given PDn(Man), we can validly ascend from the conjunction
to the universal negative sentence. In other words, with the confused and
distributive supposition of a common name occurring as the subject term of a
universal armative or a universal negative proposition, one validly descend
to a conjunction when and only when one can also validly ascend from such
a conjunction to the universal in question.
There are cases of confused and distributive supposition where the issue
of existential import is not relevant, i.e. where the existential presuppositions
of demonstrative phrases need not be fullled. In particular, a common name
occurring as the predicate of any negative categorical proposition will have
88Without the assumption that (9x)Is(x; [ThatiyS]) is true, for 1  i  n, all that would
follow by PDn(Man) is the conjunction `[If anything is that1 man, then it is running] and
... and [if anything is thatn man, then it is running]'.
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confused and distributive supposition, regardless of the issue of existential
import. The common name `runner' in `No man is a runner', for example,
unlike the common name `man', will have confused and distributive suppo-
sition independently of whether or not the existential presupposition of any
of the demonstrative phrases in question is fullled.89 In other words, by
PDm(Runner), one can descend validly to the conjunction `No man is that1
runner and ... and no man is thatm runner' without any further assumptions
about existential import.90 As a denial, `No man is a runner' is symbolized
as :(9xMan)[xIs(x; [9yRunner])](x), which, by quantier negation and -
conversion, is equivalent to (8xMan):Is(x; [9yRunner]). This last formula,
by PDm(Runner) and elementary transformations, implies
(8xMan):Is(x; [That1yRunner]) ^ ::: ^ (8xMan):Is(x; [ThatmyRunner]);
which, by quantier negation, is equivalent to the conjunction
:(9xMan)[xIs(x; [That1yRunner])](x) ^ ::: ^
^:(9xMan)[xIs(x; [ThatmyRunner])](x):
This argument can also be given in reverse order, so that one can validly
ascend, by PDm(Runner), from the conjunction to the sentence `No man is
a runner'. In other words, with confused and distributive supposition, one
can validly descend to a conjunction from a universal negative categorical
proposition when and only when one can validly ascend from the conjunction
to that proposition by the same principleregardless whether the common
name occurs as the subject or the predicate of the proposition, except that
when it is the subject, the existential presuppositions of the demonstrative
phrases in the conjunction must be fullled.
The way up is not always the same as the way down, however. Con-
sider, for example, the common name `runner' in the negative particular
89Our examples come from Spade [1996], chapter 9. Ockham and other terminists
assumed that `is running' can be construed as `is a runner'. This construal is dubious;
but we will accept it here as part of our reconstruction of terminist logic. A separate,
alternative treatment can be given for the present participle in conceptual realism in
terms of the logic of events.
90The conjuncts in this case are not singular propositions, it might be noted; but, by
PDn(Man), each conjunct can be expanded into a conjunction of singulars of the form
`Thatm+i man is not thati runner', with the negation internal to the predicate.
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proposition `Some man is not a runner' (where the negation is internal to
the predicate), which is symbolized as (9xMan)[x:Is(x; [9yRunner])](x).
Here, the common name `runner' has confused and distributive supposition,
which means that one can descend, by PDm(Runner), to the conjunction
`Some man is not this runner and ... and some man is not thatm runner'.
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Note that, by PDm(Runner), (9xMan)[x:Is(x; [9yRunner])](x) implies
(9xMan):[Is(x; [That1yRunner]) _ ::: _ Is(x; [ThatmyRunner])];
which, by elementary transformations, implies (but is not implied by)
(9xMan):Is(x; [That1yRunner]) ^ ::: ^ (9xMan):Is(x; [ThatmyRunner]);
which validates the descent to the conjunction `Some man is not this runner
and ... and some man is not thatm runner. But the reverse order of this
argument is not also valid, because, unlike the inference from (9xMan)('^ )
to (9xMan)' ^ (9xMan) , the inference from (9xMan)' ^ (9xMan) to
(9xMan)(' ^  ) is not valid. Thus, despite Heraclitus, the way up is not
always the same as the way down.
10 How Confused is Merely Confused
Merely confused supposition has been the one type of supposition that has
been controversial in terminist logic. It is the one type, for example, that
does not allow for a valid descent to either a conjunction or disjunction of
singular propositions. Ockham's main characterization is that a common
name has merely confused supposition in a categorical proposition if one
can validly descend to a disjoint predicate.92 The common name `ani-
mal', for example, has merely confused supposition in the universal ar-
mative `Every man is an animal', which, as already noted, is symbolized
as (8xMan)[xIs(x; [9yAnimal])](x). That is, by the principle of descent,
PDk(Animal), -conversion, and elementary transformations, we can validly
91Once again, the conjuncts are not singular propositions, but, by PDn(Man), each
conjunct can be expanded into a disjunction so that the nal result is a conjunction of
disjunctions of singular propositions.
92Spade [1996], p.284.
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descend from this proposition to `Every man is [this animal or that2 animal
... or thatk animal]', which is symbolized as follows:
(8xMan)[x(Is(x; [That1yAnimal]) _ ::: _ Is(x; [ThatkyAnimal]))](x):
One cannot, of course, validly distribute the universal quantier (8xMan)
over the disjunction [Is(x; [That1yAnimal])_ :::_ Is(x; [ThatkyAnimal])] to
get `Every man is this animal or ... or every man is thatk animal'. So, in
this case no further valid reduction to singulars is possible.
Some authors have found this reduction to a disjunctive predicate very
odd, as though the resulting sentence has problematic truth conditions.93
But there are many sentences in science and natural language with disjunctive
predicates that are clearly unproblematic. The sentence of arithmetic, `Every
integer is odd or even', symbolized as
(8xInteger)[x(Odd(x) _ Even(x))](x);
is perfectly clear as to its truth conditions, for example, even though it is
not further reducible to `Every integer is odd or every integer is even'.
Similarly, `Every person is either male or female' seems perfectly clear in its
truth conditions, even though it is not reducible to `Every person is male
or every person is female'.
Ockham also thinks that merely confused supposition applies to such
sentences as `John promises Simon a horse'.94 But then, merely confused
93This is Paul Spade's view in [1996], p.384. Note, however, that in our analysis we
have distributed the copula over `this animal or ... or thisk animal'. Perhaps Spade has
something like
Is(x; [That1yAnimal _ ::: _ ThatkyAnimal])
in mind as the problematic disjunctive predicate, where the copula has not been dis-
tributed. If so, then he has a point, because this expression is not well-formed.
94It is not clear that Ockham thinks of an assertion of a sentence like this as a categorical
proposition. If it is a categorical, then, apparently, it is to be rephrased with a copula,
e.g., as `John is a man who promises Simon a horse'. But then the disjunction has to
do with the dierent demonstrative phrases, `this man who promises Simon a horse or ...
or thatn man who promises Simon a horse', in which case the descent is by determinate
supposition, and therefore unproblematic. Of course, we then still have to explain the
supposition of the common name `horse' in the singulars `John is thati man who promises
Simon a horse'.
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supposition must also apply to `John gives Simon a horse', because this
sentence has the same logical form as `John promises Simon a horse'. On
our analysis, the logical form of these sentences as judgments or speech acts




Now, because `gives' is an extensional verb with respect to all of its argu-
ments, the following identity is a conceptually valid thesis of our system as
a result of the meaning postulate for Give:
[xGive(x; [9ySimon]; [9zHorse])] = [x(9zHorse)Give(x; [9ySimon]; z)]:
But then, by the principle of descent, PDj(Horse), we can validly descend
to the disjunction, `John gives Simon this horse or ... or John gives Simon
thatj horse', in symbols:
95
(9xJohn)[xGive(x; [9ySimon]; [That1zHorse])](x) _ ::: _
_ (9xJohn)[xGive(x; [9ySimon]; [ThatjzHorse])](x):
This descent, however, is not really by merely confused supposition, which,
according to Ockham, does not allow descent to a disjunction. Rather, the
95By the above identity, the meaning postulate for Is, and (MP2) of 6 above,
[x(9zHorse)Give(x; [9ySimon]; z)] = [x(9w)(Is(w; [9zHorse]) ^Give(x; [9ySimon]; w))]
is provable; and from this and PDj(Horse),
[x(9zHorse)Give(x; [9ySimon]; z)] = [x(9w)([Is(w; [That1zHorse]) _ ::: _
_Is(w; [ThatjzHorse])] ^Give(x; [9ySimon]; w))]
follows. From this last identity and the distribution of a conjunction over a disjunction,
the disjunction in question follows.
42
descent seems to be the same as that already described for determinate sup-
position.96
Nothing like this follows for `John promises Simon a horse', however; and
the reason is that, unlike `give', `promise' is not extensional in its third argu-
ment position, i.e. `promise' is an intensional verb with respect to its direct
object argument position. Yet Ockham maintained that `horse' has merely
confused supposition in this sentence, and that the descent to a disjunc-
tive predicate, as in `John promises Simon this horse or ... promises Simon
thatj horse', is valid. That is, according to Ockham, the descent from `John
promises Simon a horse', as symbolized above, to
(9xJohn)[x(Promise(x; [9ySimon]; [That1zHorse]) _ ::: _
_Promise(x; [9ySimon]; [ThatjzHorse]))](x);
is supposed to be valid, when, in fact, it is not validas many commentators
have repeatedly noted over the years.97 Unlike these other commentators,
however, we have a theoretical account in terms of deactivated referential
expressions that explains why such a descent failsand why it succeeds in
sentences having the same logical form. Based on this account, our proposal
is that a common (or proper) name that is part of a deactivated referential
expression that cannot, as it were, be activated in a given propositional
context is a name for which no mode of supposition should be said to apply
in the context in question.
96Essentially the same argument would show that `horse' has merely confused supposi-
tion, and not determinate supposition, however, in `Every man gives Simon a horse'. That
is, the descent to `Every man [gives Simon this horse or ... or gives Simon thatj horse]'
by PDj(Horse) is valid, whereas a descent to `Every man gives Simon this horse or ...
or every man gives Simon thatj horse' is not valid.
97Note that, as with the distribution of the copula over `this animal or ... or thatk
animal', we have distributed `promise' over `this horse or ... or thatj horse'. Otherwise,
the so-called disjoint predicate, as in
[xPromise(x; [That1yHorse _ ::: _ ThatjyHorse])]
is not well-formed. If this is what Ockham intended, then Spade is right to think this
appeal to disjoint terms is ... a mark of desperation ([1996], p.284).
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11 Conclusion
The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language
within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th cen-
tury. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early
view of a concept as an intentional object (the ctum theory) to his later view
of a concept as a mental act (the intellectio theory), is reconstructed in this
framework in terms of the notion of a concept as an unsaturated cognitive
structure. Referential and predicable concepts in particular are unsaturated
cognitive structures that mutually saturate each other in mental acts, anal-
ogous to the way that quantier phrases and predicate expressions mutually
saturate each other in language. Intentional objects (cta) are not rejected
but are reconstructed as the objectied intensional contents of concepts, i.e.,
as intensional objects obtained through the process of nominalizationand
in that sense as products of the evolution of language and thought. Their
reconstruction as intensional objects is an essential part of the theory of pred-
ication of conceptual realism. In particular, the truth conditions determined
by predicable concepts based on relationsincluding the relation the copula
stands forare characterized in part in terms of these objectied intensional
contents. It is by means of this conceptualist theory of predication that we
are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to
terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions.
Reference in conceptual realism, based on the exercise and mutual satu-
ration of referential and predicable concepts, is not the same as supposition
in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various modes or types of personal
supposition are accounted for in a natural and intuitive way in terms of the
theory of reference of conceptual realism. Ockham's application of merely
confused supposition to common names occurring within the scope of an in-
tensional verb is rejected, as it should be, but its rejection is grounded on the
notion of a deactivated referential concepta deactication that, because of
the intensionality of the context in question, cannot be activated, the way
it can be in extensional contexts.
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